Search This Blog

Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Η Ελλάδα, η Γερμανία και η Ευρωπαική...αποχαύνωση


Σε ένα "φλάς μπακ" σχεδόν 10 χρόνια πριν, όταν επέστρεφα λόγω σπουδών απο την Αγγλία στην Ελλάδα είχα στη τσέπη μου ακόμα δραχμές. Μου πήρε λίγο μέχρι να πάρω εμπρός με το Ευρώ. Έβλεπα πολλούς να κυκλοφορούν με κάτι κομπιουτεράκια που μετέτρεπαν τις δραχμές σε ευρώ. Και όσο περισσότερο πάταγαν τα πλήκτρα, τόσο περισσότερο τα πρόσωπά τους γίνονταν σκυθρωπά. Όχι λόγω δυσκολίας της μετατροπής, αλλά λόγω της αντίληψης ότι το κόστος ζωής ακολουθούσε μια αύξηση γεωμετρικής κλίμακας.

10 χρόνια (και κάμποσες κυβερνήσεις) αργότερα, μάθαμε (λες και δεν το ξέραμε) ότι η Ελλάδα βρίσκεται στα πρόθυρα της πτώχευσης. Βαρυσήμαντες δηλώσεις ερχόμενων και απερχόμενων Πρωθυπουργών και Υπουργών, οι οποίοι "ένιπταν τας χείρας των" (δεν ήξεραν και δεν συμμετείχαν σε προηγούμενες κυβερνήσεις άραγε;), μιλώντας για δύσκολες μέρες. Και να σου οι μεγάλοι χρηματοπιστωτικοί οίκοι με τις υποβαθμίσεις της πιστοληπτικής μας ικανότητας, συνεπικουρούμενοι από τους επικεφαλείς της ΕΚΤ, οι οποίοι πρότειναν τα ζωνάρια να γίνουν πιο σφιχτά για τους πολλούς. Εντάξει, όλες οι γιορτές κάποτε τελειώνουν και ήταν αναμενόμενο τόσα χρόνια διαφθοράς και κακοδιαχείρισης να έχουν ένα ηχηρό τέλος (τώρα και να θέλουν κάποιοι τα φαγοπότια, είναι πλέον αργά).

Έκπληξη πάντως μου προκάλεσε το γεγονός ότι η Γερμανία πρωταγωνιστούσε στο κράξιμο της Ελλάδας. Όχι γιατί δεν πληρούσαμε τις προδιαγραφές για κράξιμο, αλλά γιατί αποτελούμε (κατα τη γνώμη τους) τον κύριο λόγο υποτίμησης του Ευρώ. Σίγουρα, έχουμε το μεγαλύτερο χρέος, αλλά με μια Ιταλία, με μια Ισπανία, με μια Πορτογαλία και με άλλες άλλοτε κραταιές οικονομίες να τραντάζονται απο τις επιπτώσεις μιας διεθνούς χρηματοπιστωτικής κρίσης, τα προβλήματα δεν υπάρχουν μόνο στην Ελλάδα.

Άν μπορούσα να έχω 10 μόλις λεπτά συνομιλίας με την Μέρκελ, θα ρωτούσα τρία μόνο πράγματα:
  1. Για την κρίση της Γερμανικής οικονομίας φταίει η Ελλάδα ή το γεγονός ότι η κυβέρνησή τους δαπανεί εδώ και χρόνια τώρα τεράστια ποσά χρημάτων για την ανοικοδόμηση της πρώην ανατολικής Γερμανίας;
  2.  Είναι μύθος ή πραγματικότητα ότι Γερμανικές τράπεζες ευθύνονται για την έκταση της διεθνούς χρηματοπιστωτικής κρίσης; Να αναφέρω άραγε κάποιες ηχηρές περιπτώσεις, όπως αυτή της KfW Bankengruppe και άλλες τράπεζες των οποίων οι τοποθετήσεις σε επισφαλείς επενδύσεις των μεγάλων golden boys Lehman Brothers έφταναν πάνω από 1 δις Ευρώ; Να σημειωθεί ότι η ΚfW ήταν κρατική σε ποσοστό 80% την περίοδο της τοποθέτησης των επίμαχων επισφαλειών. Που να είναι σήμερα άραγε αυτό το χρέος (τοκιζόμενο( και σε πόσους ανθρώπους στέρησε σπίτια, δάνεια και δουλειά;
  3. Σε περίοδο ισχνών αγελάδων, ποιος επωφελείται άραγε από το χαμηλό Ευρώ; Ο Έλληνας μισθωτός, ο οποίος συγκριτικά είναι απο τους πιο κακοπληρωμένους της Ευρώπης ή ο Γερμανός εξαγωγέας; Δεν λέω ότι το Ευρώ χρειάζεται την κακοδιαχείριση της Ελλάδας για να είναι χαμηλό, προς Θεού. Λέω να μη φωνάζει η Μέρκελ, σε λίγο θα βραχνιάσει, και δεν πρέπει.
Για να πάρουμε μια τελευταία πνοή ελπίδας, έπρεπε να περάσουμε από το θυμό της Γερμανικής κοινής γνώμης. Έχουν δίκιο οι Γερμανοί πολίτες. Μου φαίνεται όμως ότι αντί για την Ελληνική διαφθορά και κακοδιαχείριση, έπρεπε να θυμώσουν και για την ηλιθιότητα και ατιμία των οικονομικών τους αναλυτών και τραπεζών.

Έτσι για να βγουν λίγο απο το θεσμό της Ευρωπαικής...αποχαύνωσης!

Monday, February 22, 2010

Were google attacks an insider threat problem?

Recently, I came across Bruce Schneier's view on the Google "Chinese" hacking attacks. In essence, he analyzes the situation mentioning various facts (the existence of backdoors to various systems due to wire tap requirements) and concludes about the dangers of building the ultimate surveillance system and establishing a police state.

I think that the title of the article is a bit misleading though. In my honest opinion, the title should instead read : "US fails to handle the inside threat problem in critical surveillance infrastructures". I will explain my point of view.

Schneier's view is fundamentally correct. Indeed, we need to be careful about the procedures and the persons who handle surveillance systems (I am not going to discuss here whether we need these systems, this is a big issue. For the purposes of highlighting the insider issue I axiomatically accept that we do need them).  This essentially points to the insider problem, a big issue that is left to the side in the process of securing surveillance infrastructures.

I do not want to reveal details I do not know about, but from my experience as a system administrator and security researcher, I understand that it takes a lot more than knowing the existence of a backdoor to a system to exploit it. Google might have indeed left backdoors to Gmail, this creates a vulnerability. To exploit this vulnerability a catalyst is needed and that is the person who knows the failsafes (procedures/passwords) and hands them over (intentional misuse) or a person that is naive enough to design procedures that are too open (accidental misuse). Without these factors, it is difficult for me to accept that Google's systems could have been compromised.

Interestingly enough, Schneier mentions the high profile wiretap case of the Greek government in June 2004. In my view, the problem was not that Ericsson enabled the surveillance functionality into the ground stations for the Greek government, nor the fact that Vodafone Greece had issues with their procedures for enabling the issues. The very fundamental issue is that someone took a decision to consult/allow important members of the Government to discuss government issues using a normal private carrier and ordinary phones, with no further security failsafes (further encryption, VPN and other mechanisms). That is essentially a policy mistake made by an insider ( an advisor that the Government trusted to secure the communication channel or the lack of him).

I often argue that for every external breach of security, there is almost always an internal reason (naive users, laizy IT admins, absence of policies from CIOs). The same is true for surveillance systems. The funny thing is that these problems have been highlighted by many US government funded workshops of insider threats and other gatherings around the world. And my question is: "When will people listen to insider threat researchers?"

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

"Aurora" attacks: anti-virus/spyware versus intergrated application protection

(Disclaimer: I advise Promon AS  on some issues, so my opinion about Integrated Application Protection could be biased. In that case, feel free to point out tools from other sources that achieve the same functionality. I am also not on their payroll, so this not a sales pitch).

The recent targetting of Google, Adobe and IE flaws raised a lot of eyebrows and gives plenty of thought to the security analyst. This has nothing to do with  the specific Microsoft/Adobe vulnerabilities involved in the case. Software will always have vulnerabilities. It has also nothing to do with infrastructure vulnerabilities (spoofed SMTP headers, DNS targetting, more to come in a latter arcticle ). They will always be there. The question is why setups with highly capable people fail to address attacks that might be zero day (or near zero day) but they are still preventable.

In order to give an answer to this question, I can't help but notice the shortcomings of common desktop anti-virus/spyware packages. Today, most people have a desktop/server anti/virus/spyware package installed on their computer to defend themselves against various types of malware. The vendors that produce these tools do a tremendous amount of work to ensure that they protect you against many types of threats. In essence, they have industrialised the process of producing signatures (non ambigous ways of describing the malware) and then they throw a bit of heuristics to compensate for the things the signature will not catch (you cannot know everything in advance). This combination is good to catch most types of attacks, but not all (many of these products did not detect the recent aurora attacks for various reasons).

If we rely daily on computers for critical tasks, is a "good for most things" type of protection acceptable? Personally for me, it is certainly not. Sure, I use known desktop and servers anti/virus products and I always recommend them, but I always say their development strategy has many pitfalls. I am going to outline them in the next paragraphs and then prescribe a solution to these problems.

Anti-malware scanners tend to use heuristics to address (amongst other issues) the polymorphic payload of malware. Is is interesting to note that the recent "Aurora" style attacks used either malware with different payloads or different payload wrappings. This can downgrade the ability of the most carefully crafted heuristic signatures of anti-malware vendors. In fact, heuristic signatures are also responsible for "false positives", a known issue not only in the anti-malware world but also in the field of Intrusion Detection/Prevention (IDS/IPS).

Take the fact of the previous paragraph and combine it with the variety of attack techniques, operating system modules and the even greater number of applications and combine it with the need for an infrastructure to safely distribute (on almost a daily basis) the updates for the heuristics threshold and signatures and you get...the chaos. In my view, this is the very reason behind the fall back of many anti-malware vendors in the race of malware writers and
anti-malware analysts. They just can't and will not (I dare to say) keep up with these techniques. Their approach is useful but it needs a more focused complement.

As a side note, it is useful to note that beyond the anti-malware scanners, the "Aurora" style attacks can also bypass OS protection techniques such as the Data Execution Protection (DEP), at least Dan Kaminski thinks so. Other OS protection features such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) are considered immune to this type of attack when combined with DEP.

The next reasonable question is what can be a desirable complement. The answer is obvious. What is the most valuable component in the software stack that interacts and allows access to data? Yes, the application. And after the mail browser, the most critical (and for long time universal) application that gets data from the Internet and sends data to the Internet is the web browser. Application integrated protection is the key complement most people need to render stack overflow and other types of similar attacks useless.

It would also be good to minimize the reliance on a continuous update distribution channel. Infrequent updates would satisfy bad Internet connectivity scenarios, as well as lazy user and system administrators.

There are many companies out there that offer integrated application protection. And a notable one is the Norway based Promon.

Promon's Integrated Application Protection (IAP) achieves this functionality. The concept behind Promon's technology is unique and has a sound theoretical basis: If the data and the information flow are the most valuable things, the most important thing is to stop information leaking out and in to the application, making a virtual shield around it. The details of this shield are of course a trade secret and proprietary, so I hate I cannot analyze the details here. However, the important thing is that their tool caters for minimum installation hassle, minimum user intervention and a small number of updates.

I was curious to find out whether their tool could stop the "Aurora" attack payloads. It turns out that it does. showing the technology in action. Here is a video that demos their technology against "Aurora" payloads (thanks Sondov!):

demo video

md5sum: 45fc6ae7844baf243c005d0c9122d19f  aurora.mp4


On the left hand side you can see a Vmware instance simulating the victim's system and on the right hand side is the bad guy that likes to hand out malware payloads. Watch what happens on the first instance. The victim's system connects to 'evil.com' (effectively exploiting of the IE vulnerability) and then various things happen to the poor desktop. The second part repeats the experiment under the shield of Promon's guard. The application immediately detects the exploit by sensing essentially suspicious information flow in and out of IE and then it drops the bad application.

I will try to outline the technology behind promon's concept in a latter article. My point is to show that effective technology to protect (and complement other tools) vital applications in cyberinfrastructures does exist and is quite effective against professionally designed and executed attacks such as those of the recent "Aurora" wave.